Nos tutelles





Accueil > Vie scientifique > Opérations et réseaux de recherche > FELIS

FELIS (Fraud and Economic Lies : Information and Strategies)

publié le , mis à jour le

Workshop Social Norms and Moral Norms : October 16-17, 2015 in Ecully :

  • Funding organization : Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR)
  • Budget : €210 000
  • Duration : Jan. 2015-Dec.2017
  • Principal Investigator : Marie Claire Villeval
  • Other participants at GATE-LAB : J. Benistant, L. Charroin, Z. Dai, F. Galeotti, M. Joffily, C. Saucet, Q. Thévenet, A. Zylbersztejn
  • Partners : L. Denant-Boemont and D. Masclet (CREM, University of Rennes), B. Fortin and G. Lacroix (Laval University, Quebec), S. Shalvi and J. van de Ven (University of Amsterdam), and A. Suvorov (Higher School of Economics, Moscow).

Main objectives

- Trust is a core component of the freedom and security of citizens, making relationships work more cohesively and efficiently. But it is fragile. Undermining trust raises transaction costs, weakens social cohesion, and ultimately reduces the freedom of citizens and impoverishes society (Arrow, 1972). Dishonesty introduces a major threat on trust and the ubiquity of deception is a major concern of modern society.

- FELIS’s ambition is to contribute to a better understanding of the determinants of deceptive behavior in order to improve the deterrence of dishonesty and promote the security of citizens.

- FELIS seeks to understand when people are more, or less, likely to act honestly and follow the moral course of action instead of serving their strict self-interest at the others’ expense. It aims at undertaking the standard economics-of-crime approach comparing the expected monetary benefits and costs of fraudulent actions by incorporating social, moral, emotional and psychological factors in economic decision-making.

Work Packages

- Work Package 1 : Dishonesty and the maintenance of the self-concept of honesty

- Work Package 2 : Deception and the exploitation of asymmetric information

- Work Package 3 : Deterrence effect of information disclosure on the occurrence of crackdowns

- Work Package 4 : The social dimension of deception in networks and the role of peer effects.

- Work Package 5 : The restoration of trust after its destruction by dishonest behavior


- FELIS offers a unique combination of game theory, experimental economics and psychology to better understand the causes and consequences of dishonesty. It combines theoretical modeling based on behavioral economics and experimental methods (laboratory experiments, lab-in-the-field experiments, neuroeconomics).