Accueil > Membres > Les membres > Annuaire
Université Jean Monnet & GATE LSE —
10, rue Trefilerie —
42 023 Saint-Etienne Cedex 2 —
Tel. : (33) 04 77 42 19 61
Contact : [solal at univ-st-etienne.fr]
Research interests
Game Theory, History of Economic Thought
Selected publications
- Dilemma with Approval and Disapproval Votes
Social Choice and Welfare, (2019, accepted)
Joint with Gonzalez S., and Laruelle A. - Harsanyi Power Solutions for Cooperative Games on Voting Structures
International Journal of General Systems, (2019) 48 : 575-602.
Joint with Algaba E., Béal S., and Rémila E. - Coalitional Desirability and the Equal Division Value
Theory and Decision, (2019) 86 : 95-106.
Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E. - The Social Cost Problem, Rights and the (Non)Empty Core
Journal of Public Economic Theory, (2019) 21 : 347-365
Joint with Gonzalez S. and Marciano A. - The Proportional Shapley Value and Applications.
Games and Economic Behavior, (2018) 108 : 93-112.
Joint with Béal S., Ferrières S., and Rémila E. - Axiomatization of an Allocation Rule for Ordered Tree TU-games.
Mathematical Social Sciences, (2018) 93:132-140.
Joint with Béal S., Ferrières S., and Rémila E. - Two-step Values for Games with Two-level Communication Structure.
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, (2018) 35:563-587.
Joint with Béal S. and Khmelnitskaya A. - Axiomatization and Implementation of a Class of Solidarity Values for TU-games.
Theory and Decision, (2017) 83:61-94.
Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E. - Discounted Tree Solutions.
Discrete Applied Mathematics, (2017) 219:1-17.
Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E. - A Strategic Implementation of the Sequential Equal Surplus Division Rule for Rooted Trees.
Annals of Operations Research, (2017) 253:43-59.
Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E. - Comparable Axiomatizations of Two Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility and their Subclass of Data Games.
Journal of Public Economic Theory, (2016) 18:992-1004.
Joint with Béal S. and Deschamps M. - Characterizations of Three Linear Values for TU games by Associated Consistency : Simple Proofs using the Jordan Normal Form.
International Game Theory Review, (2016) 18:1 1650003 (21 pages).
Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E. - Characterizations of Weighted and Equal Division Values.
Theory and Decision, (2016) 80:649-667.
Joint with Béal S., Casajus A., Huettner F. and Rémila E. - Axiomatic Characterizations under Players Nullification.
Mathematical Social Sciences, (2016) 80:47-57.
Joint with Béal S., Ferrières S., and Rémila E. - Axioms of Invariance for TU-games.
International Journal of Game Theory, (2015) 44:891-902.
Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E. - The Sequential Equal Surplus Division for Rooted Forest Games and an Application to Sharing a River with Bifurcations.
Theory and Decision, (2015) 79:251-283.
Joint with Béal S., Ghintran A. and Rémila E. - Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its Kernel.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, (2015) 60:159-165.
Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E. - A Geometric Examination of Majorities Based on Difference in Support.
Social Choice and Welfare, (2015) 45:123-153.
Joint with Baron R., Diss M. and Rémila E. - Decomposition of the Space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf Value.
Operations Research Letters, (2015) 43:123-125.
Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E. - A Decomposition of the Space of TU-games Using Addition and Transfer Invariance.
Discrete Applied Mathematics, (2015) 184:1-13.
Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E. - Preserving or Removing Special Players : What Keeps your Payoff Unchanged in TU-games ?
Mathematical Social Sciences, (2015) 73:23-31.
Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E. - Solidarity within a Fixed Community.
Economics Letters, (2014) 125:440-443.
Joint with Béal S., Casajus A., Huettner F. and Rémila E. - Local Interactions and p-Best Response Set.
Journal of Applied Mathematics, (2014), Article ID 415686, 7 pages.
Joint with Durieu J. - Accessibility and Stability of the Coalition Structure Core.
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, (2013) 78:187-202.
Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E. - The River Sharing Problem : a Survey.
International Game Theory Review, (2013) 15 :(1340016)1-19.
Joint with Béal S., Ghintran A. and Rémila E. - An Optimal Bound to Access the Core in TU-games.
Games and Economic Behavior, (2013) 80:1-9.
Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E. - Weighted Component Fairness.
Mathematical Social Sciences, (2012) 64:144-151.
Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E. - Fairness and Fairness for Neighbors : The Difference between the Myerson Value and Component-Wise Egalitarian Solutions.
Economics Letters, (2012) 117:263-267.
Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E. - The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games.
Annals of Operations Research, (2012) 196:27-51.
Joint with Béal S., Lardon A. and Rémila E. - On the Number of Blocks Required to Access the Core.
Discrete Applied Mathematics, (2012) 160:925-932.
Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E. - Compensations in the Shapley Value and the Compensation Solutions for Graph Games.
International Journal of Game Theory, (2012) 41:157-178.
Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E. - Adaptive Learning and p-best Response Sets.
International Journal of Game Theory, (2011) 40:735-747.
Joint with Durieu J. and Tercieux O. - Average Tree Solutions and the Distribution of Harsanyi Dividends.
International Journal of Game Theory, (2011) 40:331-349.
Joint with Baron R., Béal S. and Rémila E. - Nonspecific Networking.
Games, (2011) 2:87-113.
Joint with Durieu J. and Haller H. - Partial Cooperative Equilibria : Existence and Characterization.
Games, (2010) 1:338-356.
Joint with Béal S., Chakrabarti S. and Ghintran A. - Rooted-tree Solutions for Tree-games.
European Journal of Operational Research, (2010) 203:404-408.
Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E. - Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games.
Mathematical Social Sciences, (2008) 56:303-313.
Joint with Béal S. and Durieu J. - Ordinal Games.
International Game Theory Review, (2008) 10:177-194.
Joint with Durieu J., Haller H. and Quérou N. - Good Neighbors are Hard to Find : Computational Complexity of Network Formation.
Review of Economic Design, (2008) 12:1-19.
Joint with Baron R., Durieu J., Haller H. and Savani R. - Complexity and Stochastic Evolution of Dyadic Networks.
Computers & Operations Research, (2006) 33:312-327.
Joint with Baron R., Durieu J., Haller H. - Finding a Nash Equilibrium in Spatial Games is an NP-Complete Problem.
Economic Theory, (2004) 23:445-454.
Joint with Baron R., Durieu J. and Haller H. - Adaptive Play with Spatial Sampling.
Games and Economic Behavior, (2003) 43:189-195.
Joint with Durieu J. - Control Costs and Potential Functions for Spatial Games.
International Journal of Game Theory, (2003) 31:541-561.
Joint with Baron R., Durieu J. and Haller H. - A Note on Control Costs and Logit Rules for Strategic Games.
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, (2002) 12:563-575.
Joint with Baron R., Durieu J. and Haller H.