Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique - UMR5824

Université Jean Monnet & GATE LSE —
10, rue Trefilerie —
42 023 Saint-Etienne Cedex 2 —
Tel. : (33) 04 77 42 19 61

Contact : [solal at univ-st-etienne.fr]

Research interests

Game Theory - Social Choice Theory - History of Economic Thought

Working papers

• Lexicographic Solutions for Coalitional Rankings Based on Individual and Collective Performances.
  Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E. (2021).

• A Core-partition Solution for Coalitional Rankings with a Variable Population Domain.
  Joint with Béal S., and Ferrières S. (2021).

• Filters in Abstract Aggregation with Infinite Sequences of Signals.
  Joint with Cato S., Gonzalez S., and Rémila E. (2021).

• Resolving Intergenerational Conflicts by Using Approval Voting.
  Joint with Cato S., and Rémila E. (2021).

• The Multidimensional h-index as a Sport Ranking : Axiomatic and Empirical Results.
  Joint with Béal S., Ferrières S., and Rémila E. (2020).

Selected publications

• Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Restricted Communication and A Priori Unions Based on the Myerson Value and the Average Tree Solution.
  Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, (2021) Accepted .
  Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E.
• The Priority Value for Cooperative Games with a Priority Structure.
  International Journal of Game Theory, (2021) Accepted .
  Joint with Béal S., and Ferrières S.
• Infinite-Population Approval Voting : A Proposal.
  Synthese, (2021) Accepted.
  Joint with Cato S., and Rémila E.
• INFLUENCE : A Partizan Scoring Game on Graphs.
  Theoretical Computer Science, (2021) 878-879 : 26-46.
  Joint with Duchêne E., Gonzalez S., Parreau A., and Rémila E.
• Lexicographic Solutions for Coalitional Rankings.
  Social Choice and Welfare, (2021) Accepted.
  Joint with Algaba E., Moretti S., and Rémila E.
• Cohesive Efficiency in TU-games : Axiomatizations of Variants of the Shapley Value, Egalitarian values and their Convex Combinations.
  Annals of Operations Research, (2021) 302 : 23-47.
  Joint with Béal S., Casajus A., and Rémila E.
• Cooperative Games on Intersection Closed Systems and the Shapley Value.
  Mathematical Social Sciences, (2020) 104:15-22.
  Joint with Béal S., Moyouwou I., and Rémila E.
• Dilemma with Approval and Disapproval Votes.
  Social Choice and Welfare, (2019) 53 : 495-517.
  Joint with Gonzalez S., and Laruelle A.
• Harsanyi Power Solutions for Cooperative Games on Voting Structures.
  International Journal of General Systems, (2019) 48 : 575-602.
  Joint with Algaba E., Béal S., and Rémila E.
• Coalitional Desirability and the Equal Division Value.
  Theory and Decision, (2019) 86 : 95-106.
  Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E.
• The Social Cost Problem, Rights and the (Non)Empty Core.
  Journal of Public Economic Theory, (2019) 21 : 347-365.
  Joint with Gonzalez S. and Marciano A.
• The Proportional Shapley Value and Applications.
  Games and Economic Behavior, (2018) 108 : 93-112.
  Joint with Béal S., Ferrières S., and Rémila E.
• Axiomatization of an Allocation Rule for Ordered Tree TU-games.
  Mathematical Social Sciences, (2018) 93:132-140.
  Joint with Béal S., Ferrières S., and Rémila E.
• Two-step Values for Games with Two-level Communication Structure.
  Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, (2018) 35:563-587.
  Joint with Béal S. and Khmelnitskaya A.
• Axiomatization and Implementation of a Class of Solidarity Values for TU-games.
  Theory and Decision, (2017) 83:61-94.
  Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E.
• Discounted Tree Solutions.
  Discrete Applied Mathematics, (2017) 219:1-17.
  Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E.
• A Strategic Implementation of the Sequential Equal Surplus Division Rule for Rooted Trees.
  Annals of Operations Research, (2017) 253:43-59.
  Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E.
• Comparable Axiomatizations of Two Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility and their Subclass of Data Games.
  Journal of Public Economic Theory, (2016) 18:992-1004.
  Joint with Béal S. and Deschamps M.
• Characterizations of Three Linear Values for TU games by Associated Consistency : Simple Proofs using the Jordan Normal Form.
  International Game Theory Review, (2016) 18:1 1650003 (21 pages).
  Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
• Characterizations of Weighted and Equal Division Values.
  Theory and Decision, (2016) 80:649-667.
  Joint with Béal S., Casajus A., Huettner F. and Rémila E.
• Axiomatic Characterizations under Players Nullification.
  Mathematical Social Sciences, (2016) 80:47-57.
  Joint with Béal S., Ferrières S., and Rémila E.
• Axioms of Invariance for TU-games.
  International Journal of Game Theory, (2015) 44:891-902.
  Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
• The Sequential Equal Surplus Division for Rooted Forest Games and an Application to Sharing a River with Bifurcations.
  Theory and Decision, (2015) 79:251-283.
  Joint with Béal S., Ghintran A. and Rémila E.
• Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its Kernel.
  Journal of Mathematical Economics, (2015) 60:159-165.
  Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
• A Geometric Examination of Majorities Based on Difference in Support.
  Social Choice and Welfare, (2015) 45:123-153.
  Joint with Baron R., Diss M. and Rémila E.
• Decomposition of the Space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf Value.
  Operations Research Letters, (2015) 43:123-125.
  Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E.
• A Decomposition of the Space of TU-games Using Addition and Transfer Invariance.
  Discrete Applied Mathematics, (2015) 184:1-13.
  Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
• Preserving or Removing Special Players : What Keeps your Payoff Unchanged in TU-games ?
  Mathematical Social Sciences, (2015) 73:23-31.
  Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E.
• Solidarity within a Fixed Community.
  Economics Letters, (2014) 125:440-443.
  Joint with Béal S., Casajus A., Huettner F. and Rémila E.
• Local Interactions and p-Best Response Set.
  Journal of Applied Mathematics, (2014), Article ID 415686, 7 pages.
  Joint with Durieu J.
• Accessibility and Stability of the Coalition Structure Core.
  Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, (2013) 78:187-202.
  Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E.
• The River Sharing Problem : a Survey.
  International Game Theory Review, (2013) 15 :(1340016)1-19.
  Joint with Béal S., Ghintran A. and Rémila E.
• An Optimal Bound to Access the Core in TU-games.
  Games and Economic Behavior, (2013) 80:1-9.
  Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
• Weighted Component Fairness.
  Mathematical Social Sciences, (2012) 64:144-151.
  Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
• Fairness and Fairness for Neighbors : The Difference between the Myerson Value and Component-Wise Egalitarian Solutions.
  Economics Letters, (2012) 117:263-267.
  Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
• The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games.
  Annals of Operations Research, (2012) 196:27-51.
  Joint with Béal S., Lardon A. and Rémila E.
• On the Number of Blocks Required to Access the Core.
  Discrete Applied Mathematics, (2012) 160:925-932.
  Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
• Compensations in the Shapley Value and the Compensation Solutions for Graph Games.
  International Journal of Game Theory, (2012) 41:157-178.
  Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
• Adaptive Learning and p-best Response Sets.
  International Journal of Game Theory, (2011) 40:735-747.
  Joint with Durieu J. and Tercieux O.
• Average Tree Solutions and the Distribution of Harsanyi Dividends.
  International Journal of Game Theory, (2011) 40:331-349.
  Joint with Baron R., Béal S. and Rémila E.
• Nonspecific Networking.
  Games, (2011) 2:87-113.
  Joint with Durieu J. and Haller H.
• Partial Cooperative Equilibria : Existence and Characterization.
  Games, (2010) 1:338-356.
  Joint with Béal S., Chakrabarti S. and Ghintran A.
• Rooted-tree Solutions for Tree-games.
  European Journal of Operational Research, (2010) 203:404-408.
  Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
• Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games.
  Mathematical Social Sciences, (2008) 56:303-313.
  Joint with Béal S. and Durieu J.
• Ordinal Games.
  International Game Theory Review, (2008) 10:177-194.
  Joint with Durieu J., Haller H. and Quérou N.
• Good Neighbors are Hard to Find : Computational Complexity of Network Formation.
  Review of Economic Design, (2008) 12:1-19.
  Joint with Baron R., Durieu J., Haller H. and Savani R.
• Complexity and Stochastic Evolution of Dyadic Networks.
  Computers & Operations Research, (2006) 33:312-327.
  Joint with Baron R., Durieu J., Haller H.
• Finding a Nash Equilibrium in Spatial Games is an NP-Complete Problem.
  Economic Theory, (2004) 23:445-454.
  Joint with Baron R., Durieu J. and Haller H.
• Adaptive Play with Spatial Sampling.
  Games and Economic Behavior, (2003) 43:189-195.
  Joint with Durieu J.
• Control Costs and Potential Functions for Spatial Games.
  International Journal of Game Theory, (2003) 31:541-561.
  Joint with Baron R., Durieu J. and Haller H.
• A Note on Control Costs and Logit Rules for Strategic Games.
  Journal of Evolutionary Economics, (2002) 12:563-575.
  Joint with Baron R., Durieu J. and Haller H.