Nos tutelles

CNRS

IdEx

LabEx

Rechercher



Accueil > Membres > Les membres > Annuaire

Billand Pascal

Toutes les versions de cet article : English , français

Fields of interests

  • Industrial organization
  • Game Theory
  • Economic Theory

- Publications

  1. Billand P., Bravard C., Kamphorst J., Sarangi S., (2017) Network formation when players seek confirmation of information. Mathematical Social Sciences. N. 89, 20-31.
  2. Billand P., Bravard C., Chakrabarti S.,IYENGAR S.S., KUMAR R., Sarangi S., (2016) Network Connectivity under Node Failure. Economic Letters. N. 149, 164-167.
  3. Billand P., Bravard C., Chakrabarti S., Sarangi S., (2016) Business Intelligence and Multimarket Competition. Journal of Public Economic Theory. N. 18 (2), 248-267.
  4. Billand P., Bravard C., Durieu J., Sarangi S., (2015) Efficient Networks for a Class of Games with Global Spillovers. Journal of Mathematical Economics. N. 61, 203-210.
  5. Billand P., Bravard C., Chakrabarti S., Sarangi S., (2014) A Note on Networks of Collaboration in Multi-market Oligopolies. The Annal of Regional Sciences. N. 53, 325-335.
  6. Billand P., Bravard C., Sarangi S., (2013) A Note on Local Spillovers, Convexity and the Strategic Substitutes Property in Networks. Theory and Decision. N. 75 (2), 293-304.
  7. Billand P., Bravard C., Sarangi S., (2013) Modeling Resource Flow Asymmetries using Condensation Networks. Social Choice and Welfare. N. 41 (3), 537-549.
  8. Billand P., Bravard C., Sarangi S., (2012) Existence of Nash networks and Partner Heterogeneity. Mathematical Social Sciences. N. 64 (2), 152-158.
  9. Billand P., Bravard C., Sarangi S., (2012) On the Interaction between Heterogeneity and Decay in Two-way Flow Models. Theory and Decision. N. 73 ( 4), 525-538.
  10. Billand P., Bravard C., Sarangi S. (2012). Directed Networks with Spillovers. Journal of Public Economic Theory. N 14 (6), 849-878.
  11. Billand P., Bravard C., Sarangi S. (2011). Nash Networks with Imperfect Reliability and Heterogeneous Players. International Game Theory Review. N. 13, 181-194.
  12. Billand P., Bravard C., Sarangi S. (2011). Strict Nash Networks and Partner Heterogeneity. International Journal of Game Theory, N. 40, 515-525.
  13. Billand P., Bravard C., Sarangi. S. (2010). The Insider-Outsider Model Reexamined. Games, N. 1 (4), 422-437.
  14. Autant-Bernard C., Billand P., Massard N. (2010). L’Économie Industrielle depuis 30 ans : Réalisations et Perspectives. Innovation et Espace - des Externalités aux Réseaux, Revue d’Économie Industrielle. N. 129-130, 203-236.
  15. Billand P., Bravard C., Sarangi. S. (2008). A Note on Existence of Nash Networks in One-way Flow Models. Economics Bulletin, N. 79, 1-4.
  16. Billand P., Bravard C., Sarangi S. (2008). Existence of Nash Networks in One-way Flow Models. Economic Theory, N. 37, 491-507.
  17. Autant-Bernard C., P. Billand, D. Frachisse, N. Massard (2007). Social Distance versus Spatial Distance in R&D Cooperation. Empirical Evidence from European Collaboration Choices in Micro and Nanotechnologies. Regional Science, N. 86 (3), 495-519.
  18. Billand P., Bravard C. (2006). Les Modèles de Comportements Adaptatifs Appliqués à l’Oligopole de Cournot. Revue d’Économie Industrielle. N. 114-115, 161-184.
  19. Billand P., Bravard C. (2005). A Note on the Characterization of Nash Networks. Mathematical Social Sciences, N. 49, 355-365.
  20. Billand P., Bravard C. (2004). Non-Cooperative Networks in Oligopolies. International Journal of Industrial Organization, N. 22, 593-609.
  21. Billand P. (1998). Rationalité et Coopération : Le Rôle de la Confiance en Économie. Revue d’Économie Industrielle. N. 84, 67-84.
  22. Billand P. (1998). Théorie des Coûts de Transaction versus Théorie des Réseaux : Quelques Enseignements de la Confrontation aux Réalités Industrielles. Économie et Sociétés. N. 32, 7, pp. 163-182.