Agenda scientifique

Fév
18
mar
2025
Sreoshi Banerjee (Budapest University of Technology and Economics) – On the (non)-coincidence of the serial and Shapley solutions nulti-server waiting line problems
Fév 18 @ 10 h 30 – 11 h 45

Existing literature on single-server waiting line problems (sequencing, queueing, and scheduling) has traditionally designed equitable compensations by associating a transferable utility (TU) game to a problem and assign agents their respective Shapley shares. We study two widely acceptable cost sharing rules:  the Shapley value and the serial rule. We identify the domains in which these two rules coincide and, for those in which they differ, provide a rationale for why the serial rule is a preferable approach to cost-sharing over the Shapley value. We show that the optimistic Shapley agrees with the serial rule in the following domains: (1) multi-server queueing with divisible or non-divisible jobs; and (2) multi-server scheduling with non-divisible jobs. This coincidence fails for multi-server scheduling with divisible jobs. The pessimistic Shapley agrees with the reverse serial rule in: (1) multi-server queueing with divisible or non-divisible jobs. This coincidence fails in multi-server scheduling with divisible or non-divisible jobs. From a fairness viewpoint, the pessimistic Shapley value satisfies an undesirable property called “order reversal”, in contrast to the reverse serial rule, which satisfies “order preservation”. We characterize the serial and reverse serial rules for all the above domains.

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Mar
18
mar
2025
Hassan Nosratabadi (Universite Libre de Bruxelles) – TBA
Mar 18 @ 10 h 30 – 12 h 00
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Mar
25
mar
2025
Federico Fioravanti (GATE LSE) – TBA
Mar 25 @ 10 h 30 – 11 h 45
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Avr
8
mar
2025
Isaac Amedanou (GATE) – Economic Sanctions and Taxation of Natural Resource Rent: Evidence from Spatial Analysis
Avr 8 @ 10 h 30 – 11 h 45

In this study, we analyze the effects of economic sanctions on the taxation of natural resources in targeted countries using de jure and de facto measure of
the resource rent average effective tax rate (AETR). We rely on a sample of 20 African countries for de jure AETR and a global sample of 75 developing
and developed countries for the de facto one over the period 2000 to 2020. Based on a Spatial Durbin Model, which account for the spillover effects of
sanctions, we find three key results. First, sanctions are contagious across neighboring countries. Second, economic sanctions have a significant effect
on de jure AETR but not on de facto AETR. Third, the results remain consistently heterogeneous while considering the nature (financial or trade)
and the origin (bilateral or multilateral) of the sanctions. The implication is that economic sanctions affect the resource taxation policies of the target
countries, which contribute to limit the adverse effect of sanctions on their de facto share of resource rent.

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