UMR 5824

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique

Le "GATE Lyon-Saint-Etienne" (Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique) est une Unité Mixte de Recherche (UMR5824) rattachée au CNRS Sciences humaines & sociales, à l'Université Lumière-Lyon 2, à l'Université Jean Monnet-St-Etienne et à l'emlyon.

Arno Riedl, visiting fellow

GATE is pleased to welcome Arno Riedl, Professor of public economics at Maastricht University and visiting fellow at Collegium de Lyon, from September 2024 to June 2025. In his research he uses an interdisciplinary approach to investigate human behavior.

Call for GATE PhD

Do you have a Master 2 in economics, or are you currently enrolled in a Master 2 program and considering pursuing a PhD?

Le GATE recrute

Le GATE recrute 4 enseignants-chercheurs pour la rentrée universitaire 2025-2026.

Prochains évènements

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Fév
18
mar
2025
Sreoshi Banerjee (Budapest University of Technology and Economics) – On the (non)-coincidence of the serial and Shapley solutions nulti-server waiting line problems
Fév 18 @ 10 h 30 – 11 h 45

Existing literature on single-server waiting line problems (sequencing, queueing, and scheduling) has traditionally designed equitable compensations by associating a transferable utility (TU) game to a problem and assign agents their respective Shapley shares. We study two widely acceptable cost sharing rules:  the Shapley value and the serial rule. We identify the domains in which these two rules coincide and, for those in which they differ, provide a rationale for why the serial rule is a preferable approach to cost-sharing over the Shapley value. We show that the optimistic Shapley agrees with the serial rule in the following domains: (1) multi-server queueing with divisible or non-divisible jobs; and (2) multi-server scheduling with non-divisible jobs. This coincidence fails for multi-server scheduling with divisible jobs. The pessimistic Shapley agrees with the reverse serial rule in: (1) multi-server queueing with divisible or non-divisible jobs. This coincidence fails in multi-server scheduling with divisible or non-divisible jobs. From a fairness viewpoint, the pessimistic Shapley value satisfies an undesirable property called “order reversal”, in contrast to the reverse serial rule, which satisfies “order preservation”. We characterize the serial and reverse serial rules for all the above domains.

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Fév
20
jeu
2025
Roel van Veldhuizen (Lund University) – Gender Differences in Self-Promotion and Career Advice
Fév 20 @ 10 h 45 – 12 h 00

We study the role of self-promotion and career advice in sustaining gender differences in labor market outcomes. We conduct an online experiment in which “advisers” advise “workers” to choose between a more ambitious and a less ambitious task based on the worker’s subjective self-assessment. We find that women have lower self-assessments and receive less ambitious career advice as a result. We also show that these gender differences are similar for both quantitative and qualitative self-assessments, and that the gender difference in advice received can be mitigated by informing advisers of the workers’ true performance or of the gender gap in self-promotion.

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Fév
27
jeu
2025
Mariana Blanco (University of Torino) – Beyond Good Intentions: Navigating the Maze of Altruistic Behavior
Fév 27 @ 10 h 45 – 12 h 00

Although altruistic behavior is well established, recent evidence suggests that it is only partly genuine, reflecting instead the desire to appear fair, either to themselves or to others.

In a lab experiment with 288 participants, we measured the extent of posturing and its relationship with other dimensions of social preferences. We implement a within-subject design that uses the different variations of the modified dictator game in Blanco et al. (2011) to elicit inequality concerns in Other-Other allocations and in Self-Other allocations in several cases: solely allocation (modified dictator game), under plausible deniability (moral wiggle room), and with the possibility to exert positive and negative reciprocity towards the allocator when in the role of the recipient. For the measurement of the moral wiggle room, our instrument allows not only to identify wrigglers, but also to convey an estimate of their posturing degree. In fact, departing from most of the tasks in the literature (based on the standard dictator game), our experimental protocol allows subjects to trade off their concern for money and reputational incentives at the margin without fully revealing their type.

More importantly, our design allows us to classify subjects along two dimensions: social image concern and deontological preferences. Once classified in this way, subjects show consistent, yet different, patterns of moral wiggle room and reciprocity. Overall, the use of the moral wiggle room is not prevalent. Only 38% of our subjects are less altruistic when their choice is hidden by the presence of a random draw than when it is fully observable. Interestingly those classified as Kantians (47% of our sample) are more prone to use the moral wiggle room than consequentialists (28%). While 37% of Kantians are moral wigglers, for consequentialists they represent only 29% of their group. Additionally, Kantians are more reciprocal in the intensive margin, but more likely to avoid punishing others. Moreover, non-reciprocal Kantians are often moral wrigglers.

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Mar
18
mar
2025
Hassan Nosratabadi (Universite Libre de Bruxelles) – TBA
Mar 18 @ 10 h 30 – 12 h 00
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Stephan Jagau (Nottingham University Business School) – TBA
Mar 18 @ 10 h 45 – 12 h 00
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Mar
25
mar
2025
Federico Fioravanti (GATE LSE) – TBA
Mar 25 @ 10 h 30 – 11 h 45
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Mar
27
jeu
2025
Simone Quercia (University of Verona) – TBA
Mar 27 @ 10 h 45 – 12 h 00
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Mar
31
lun
2025
Boon Han (Exeter) — TBA
Mar 31 @ 11 h 00 – 12 h 15
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Avr
7
lun
2025
Michela Chessa (Nice) — TBA
Avr 7 @ 11 h 00 – 12 h 15
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Avr
8
mar
2025
Isaac Amedanou (GATE) – Economic Sanctions and Taxation of Natural Resource Rent: Evidence from Spatial Analysis
Avr 8 @ 10 h 30 – 11 h 45

In this study, we analyze the effects of economic sanctions on the taxation of natural resources in targeted countries using de jure and de facto measure of
the resource rent average effective tax rate (AETR). We rely on a sample of 20 African countries for de jure AETR and a global sample of 75 developing
and developed countries for the de facto one over the period 2000 to 2020. Based on a Spatial Durbin Model, which account for the spillover effects of
sanctions, we find three key results. First, sanctions are contagious across neighboring countries. Second, economic sanctions have a significant effect
on de jure AETR but not on de facto AETR. Third, the results remain consistently heterogeneous while considering the nature (financial or trade)
and the origin (bilateral or multilateral) of the sanctions. The implication is that economic sanctions affect the resource taxation policies of the target
countries, which contribute to limit the adverse effect of sanctions on their de facto share of resource rent.

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Derniers articles parus

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Article dans une revue

2025

ref_biblio
Yann Braouézec, Keyvan Kiani. Preventing Price-Mediated Contagion Due to Fire Sales Externalities : Strategic Foundations of Macroprudential Regulation. Operations Research, 2025, 73 (1), 40-60 p. ⟨10.1287/opre.2023.0237⟩. ⟨hal-04817941⟩
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ref_biblio
Jiakun Zheng, Hélène Couprie, Astrid Hopfensitz. Collective risk-taking by couples : Individual vs household risk. Theory and Decision, In press, 31 p. ⟨10.1007/s11238-024-10021-z⟩. ⟨hal-04911748⟩
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BibTex