Satoshi Nakada (School of Management, Department of Business Economics, Tokyo University of Science) – Coalition and Permission Structures in TU-games: Theoretical Insights and Application to Liability Situations

Quand :
18/06/2024 @ 10 h 30 – 11 h 45
2024-06-18T10:30:00+02:00
2024-06-18T11:45:00+02:00

This paper introduces a new framework for TU-games that combines coalition and permission structures, accounting for hierarchical relationships among a priori unions. These structures naturally arise in liability situations involving a sequence of (distinct) parties. We propose a new allocation rule, the permission-Owen value, which merges the (conjunctive) permission value with the Owen value. We provide axiomatizations for this rule based on principles of monotonicity and fairness.