Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique
Le "GATE Lyon-Saint-Etienne" (Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique) est une Unité Mixte de Recherche (UMR5824) rattachée au CNRS Sciences humaines & sociales, à l'Université Lumière-Lyon 2, à l'Université Jean Monnet-St-Etienne et à l'emlyon.
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Voir toutes les actualitésPostes d'ATER
Recrutement : Assistant.e en gestion financière et comptable (CDD 6 mois)
Recrutement : Référent administratif et financier
Junior Professor Chair in Experimental and Behavioral economics
Workshop "GATE on the Docks"
Full professor positions at the University of Saint-Etienne
professor position (all levels) in health economics or health analytics
2nd Amsterdam/Saint-Etienne Workshop on Social Choice
Prochains évènements
Retour à l'agendaWe consider a model where market participants can observe the identity of the agents they can be matched with but not their types. A mechanism generates a matching and an announcement at each reported type profile. For the case of one-sided incomplete information, we fully characterize the set of matching states which are both minimally informative and stable, and show that not every assortative matching mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible. Our main result states that every seemingly informative assortative matching mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible. Such mechanisms become manipulable when incompleteness of information applies to both sides of the market.
We consider an incomplete information network game in which agents are only aware of the identity of their immediate neighbors. They form beliefs about the links of their neighbors (the rest of the network) and play a linear-quadratic effort game to maximize interim payoffs. We establish the existence and uniqueness of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In equilibrium, agents use local knowledge of their direct connections to make inferences about the complementarity strength of their actions with other agents given by their updated beliefs regarding their walks in the network. Using this and an example we show that under incomplete information, besides network architecture, agent identity plays a crucial role in determining strategic behavior. We also characterize equilibrium behavior under different forms of ex-ante prior beliefs like uniform priors, Erdos-Renyi network generation, and homophilic linkage. Not surprisingly, uniform priors provide similar results similar to degree-based models of incomplete information.
Derniers articles parus
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2024
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- Zoé Iannuzzi, Brice Mourier, Thierry Winiarski, Gislain Lipeme-Kouyi, Philippe Polomé, et al.. Contribution of different land use catchments on the microplastic pollution in detention basin sediments. Environmental Pollution, 2024, 348, pp.123882. ⟨10.1016/j.envpol.2024.123882⟩. ⟨hal-04544161⟩
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- Carla Morvan, Sonia Paty. Natural disasters and voter gratitude: What is the role of prevention policies?. Public Choice, In press, ⟨10.1007/s11127-023-01137-x⟩. ⟨hal-04393271⟩
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- Lionel Perrier, Frederic Balusson, Magali Morelle, Joël Castelli, Juliette Thariat, et al.. Cost-effectiveness of weekly adaptive radiotherapy versus standard IMRT in head and neck cancer alongside the ARTIX trial. Radiotherapy & Oncology, 2024, Radiotherapy and Oncology : Journal of the European Society For Therapeutic, 193, pp.110116. ⟨10.1016/j.radonc.2024.110116⟩. ⟨hal-04444231⟩
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