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Accueil > Membres > Les membres > Annuaire

Solal Philippe

Professeur

Toutes les versions de cet article : English , français

Université Jean Monnet & GATE LSE —
10, rue Trefilerie —
42 023 Saint-Etienne Cedex 2 —
Tel. : (33) 04 77 42 19 61

Contact : [solal at univ-st-etienne.fr]


Research interests

Game Theory, History of Economic Thought


Selected publications

    • The Proportional Shapley Value and Applications.
      Games and Economic Behavior, (2017, accepted).
      Joint with Béal S., Ferrières S., and Rémila E.
    • Axiomatization and Implementation of a Class of Solidarity Values for TU-games.
      Theory and Decision, (2017) 83:61-94
      Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E.
    • Discounted Tree Solutions.
      Discrete Applied Mathematics, (2017) 219:1-17
      Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E.
    • A Strategic Implementation of the Sequential Equal Surplus Division Rule for Rooted Trees.
      Annals of Operations Research, (2017) 253:43-59
      Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E.
    • Comparable Axiomatizations of Two Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility and their Subclass of Data Games.
      Journal of Public Economic Theory, (2016) 18:992-1004.
      Joint with Béal S. and Deschamps M.
    • Characterizations of Three Linear Values for TU games by Associated Consistency : Simple Proofs using the Jordan Normal Form.
      International Game Theory Review, (2016) 18:1 1650003 (21 pages).
      Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
    • Characterizations of Weighted and Equal Division Values.
      Theory and Decision, (2016) 80:649-667.
      Joint with Béal S., Casajus A., Huettner F. and Rémila E.
    • Axiomatic Characterizations under Players Nullification.
      Mathematical Social Sciences, (2016) 80:47-57.
      Joint with Béal S., Ferrières S., and Rémila E.
    • Axioms of Invariance for TU-games.
      International Journal of Game Theory, (2015) 44:891-902.
      Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
    • The Sequential Equal Surplus Division for Rooted Forest Games and an Application to Sharing a River with Bifurcations.
      Theory and Decision, (2015) 79:251-283.
      Joint with Béal S., Ghintran A. and Rémila E.
    • Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its Kernel.
      Journal of Mathematical Economics, (2015) 60:159-165.
      Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
    • A Geometric Examination of Majorities Based on Difference in Support.
      Social Choice and Welfare, (2015) 45:123-153.
      Joint with Baron R., Diss M. and Rémila E.
    • Decomposition of the Space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf Value.
      Operations Research Letters, (2015) 43:123-125.
      Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E.
    • A Decomposition of the Space of TU-games Using Addition and Transfer Invariance.
      Discrete Applied Mathematics, (2015) 184:1-13.
      Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
    • Preserving or Removing Special Players : What Keeps your Payoff Unchanged in TU-games ?
      Mathematical Social Sciences, (2015) 73:23-31.
      Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E.
    • Solidarity within a Fixed Community.
      Economics Letters, (2014) 125:440-443.
      Joint with Béal S., Casajus A., Huettner F. and Rémila E.
    • Local Interactions and p-Best Response Set.
      Journal of Applied Mathematics, (2014), Article ID 415686, 7 pages.
      Joint with Durieu J.
    • Accessibility and Stability of the Coalition Structure Core.
      Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, (2013) 78:187-202.
      Joint with Béal S., and Rémila E.
    • The River Sharing Problem : a Survey.
      International Game Theory Review, (2013) 15 :(1340016)1-19.
      Joint with Béal S., Ghintran A. and Rémila E.
    • An Optimal Bound to Access the Core in TU-games.
      Games and Economic Behavior, (2013) 80:1-9.
      Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
    • Weighted Component Fairness.
      Mathematical Social Sciences, (2012) 64:144-151.
      Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
    • Fairness and Fairness for Neighbors : The Difference between the Myerson Value and Component-Wise Egalitarian Solutions.
      Economics Letters, (2012) 117:263-267.
      Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
    • The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games.
      Annals of Operations Research, (2012) 196:27-51.
      Joint with Béal S., Lardon A. and Rémila E.
    • On the Number of Blocks Required to Access the Core.
      Discrete Applied Mathematics, (2012) 160:925-932.
      Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
    • Compensations in the Shapley Value and the Compensation Solutions for Graph Games.
      International Journal of Game Theory, (2012) 41:157-178.
      Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
    • Adaptive Learning and p-best Response Sets.
      International Journal of Game Theory, (2011) 40:735-747.
      Joint with Durieu J. and Tercieux O.
    • Average Tree Solutions and the Distribution of Harsanyi Dividends.
      International Journal of Game Theory, (2011) 40:331-349.
      Joint with Baron R., Béal S. and Rémila E.
    • Nonspecific Networking.
      Games, (2011) 2:87-113.
      Joint with Durieu J. and Haller H.
    • Partial Cooperative Equilibria : Existence and Characterization.
      Games, (2010) 1:338-356.
      Joint with Béal S., Chakrabarti S. and Ghintran A.
    • Rooted-tree Solutions for Tree-games.
      European Journal of Operational Research, (2010) 203:404-408.
      Joint with Béal S. and Rémila E.
    • Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games.
      Mathematical Social Sciences, (2008) 56:303-313.
      Joint with Béal S. and Durieu J.
    • Ordinal Games.
      International Game Theory Review, (2008) 10:177-194.
      Joint with Durieu J., Haller H. and Quérou N.
    • Good Neighbors are Hard to Find : Computational Complexity of Network Formation.
      Review of Economic Design, (2008) 12:1-19.
      Joint with Baron R., Durieu J., Haller H. and Savani R.
    • Complexity and Stochastic Evolution of Dyadic Networks.
      Computers & Operations Research, (2006) 33:312-327.
      Joint with Baron R., Durieu J., Haller H.
    • Finding a Nash Equilibrium in Spatial Games is an NP-Complete Problem.
      Economic Theory, (2004) 23:445-454.
      Joint with Baron R., Durieu J. and Haller H.
    • Adaptive Play with Spatial Sampling.
      Games and Economic Behavior, (2003) 43:189-195.
      Joint with Durieu J.
    • Control Costs and Potential Functions for Spatial Games.
      International Journal of Game Theory, (2003) 31:541-561.
      Joint with Baron R., Durieu J. and Haller H.
    • A Note on Control Costs and Logit Rules for Strategic Games.
      Journal of Evolutionary Economics, (2002) 12:563-575.
      Joint with Baron R., Durieu J. and Haller H.