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Accueil > GATE > Axes de recherche

Game theory, collective choice and markets

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Coordinator : Philippe Solal


The research group works on coalition formation, preference aggregation, their effects on social welfare and the allocation of resources. The methods of analysis include : axiomatic approach, computational, philosophical and historical approaches. Within this project, the topics studied by the Chair "Welfare Economics" focus on democracy, value judgments and freedom.

The members of this group also conduct research on cooperative and strategic behaviors between companies. Problems related to the choice of modes of organization of R & D, mergers and acquisitions, franchise networks, are studied from an empirical and a theoretical point of view.

Grant : ANR-blanc Dynamic Matching and Interactions : Theory and Experiments.

People :

  • Michel Bellet, PR, UJM

Secondary membership

Associate membership

PhD students

  • Adrien Lutz, UJM

Selected publications (2012-2015)

  • Allard M, Jelovac I, Léger P.T (2014) Payment mechanism and GP self-selection : Capitation versus fee for service, International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics 14:143-160.
  • Antoniadou E, Mirman LJ, Ruble R (2014) Lattices and lotteries, Mathematics of Operations Research 39:445-463.
  • Baujard A (2014) Beyond the consent dilemma in libertarian paternalism, a normative void, Homo Oeconomicus, à paraître.
  • Baujard A, Gavrel F, Igersheim H, Laslier J-F, Lebon I (2014) Who’s favored by evaluative voting ? An experiment conducted during the 2012 french presidential election, Electoral Studies, 34 : 131–145.
  • Béal S, Rémila R, Solal P (2015) Preserving or removing special players : What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games ?, Mathematical Social Sciences 73:23-31.
  • Béal S, Rémila R, Solal P (2012) Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games, International Journal of Game Theory 41:157-178.
  • Béal S, Rémila E., Solal P (2013) An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games, Games and Economic Behavior 80:1-9.
  • Billette de Villemeur E, Ruble R, Versaevel B (2014) Investment timing and vertical relationships International Journal of Industrial Organization 33:110-123.
  • Chaudey M, Fadairo M, Solard G (2013) Network integration through franchised and company-owned chains : evidence from french distribution networks, Managerial and Decision Economics 34:195-203.
  • Dargaud E, Jacques A (2014) Hidden collusion by decentralization : firms’ organization and antitrust policy, Journal of Economics, à paraître.
  • Dargaud E (2013) Mergers, remedies and efficiency gains. European Journal of Law and Economics 36:349-372.
  • Dequiedt V, Versaevel B (2013), Patent Pools and Dynamic R&D Incentives, International Review of Law and Economics 36 : 59-69.
  • Diss M, Gehrlein W.V (2012) Borda’s Paradox with weighted scoring rules, Social Choice and Welfare 38:121-136.
  • Diss M, Louichi A, Merlin V, Smaoui H (2012) An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption : The stability of scoring rules, Mathematical Social Sciences 64:57-66.
  • Fadairo M (2013) Why include royalties in distribution contracts ? Evidence from France, International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 41 : 566-583.
  • Fadairo M, Lanchimba C (2014) Organisational choices and performance in distribution systems, Applied Economics 46:1609-1623.
  • Jelovac I, Vandeninden F (2014) How should donors give foreign aid ? A theoretical comparison of aid modalities, European Journal of Development Research doi:10.1057/ejdr.2014.14.
  • Houy N, Zwicker W (2014) The geometry of voting power : weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids, Games and Economic Behavior 84 : 7-16.
  • Houy N (2013) Evolution of cooperation with similarity to an archetype, Journal of Theoretical Biology 332 : 78-88.
  • Houy N, Bloch F (2012) Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents, Economic Theory 51(1) : 13-33.
  • Ruble R, Versaevel B (2014) Market shares, R&D agreements, and the EU block exemption, International Review of Law and Economics 37:15-25.