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Working papers

publié le , mis à jour le

Working papers

2017

Information Order Shifts Criterion Placement in Perceptual Decisions

Thomas Garcia, Ismaël Rafaï, Sébastien Massoni, Working paper GATE 2017-34
Facing perceptual decisions with asymmetric stakes, individuals exhibit a conservative criterion placement. This bias prevents them from reaching the optimal decision process defined as the one which maximizes their expected payoffs. We propose in the present experimental study a non-invasive method to correct behaviors toward more optimality. We manipulate the information order between payoff information and perceptual evidence for three different incentive levels invariant regarding Signal Detection Theory predictions. Our results support the effectiveness of such manipulation : the decision strategy shifts toward optimality when payoff information is displayed last. The shift toward optimality is more pronounced for higher payoff contrasts. These results, which cannot be explained within the Signal Detection Theory framework, give new insights on the cognitive processes responsible for the conservative criterion placement

Why test the theory of incentives in a dynamic framework ?

Magali Chaudey, Working paper GATE 2017-33
The recognition that contracts have a time dimension has given rise to an abundant literature since the end of the 1980s. In such a dynamic context, the contract may take place over several periods, and agents develop repeated interactions. Surprisingly, few papers have tried to apply the predictions of the dynamic theory incentives to data. However, taking a dynamic context into account can improve static empirical approaches by introducing new tools to distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard, two asymmetrical contexts representative of the Principal–Agent model, or by solving the problem of endogeneity. A dynamic empirical approach also allows to renew the theoretical contract conception, and reveals some new features of contracts : memory, learning, and commitment.