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Versaevel Bruno

Professor of Economics at emlyon business school



- Billette de Villemeur, E., Dequiedt, V., and B. Versaevel, 2021, “Pool patents to get COVID vaccines and drugs to all”, Nature, 591, p. 529.

- Billette de Villemeur, E., and B. Versaevel, 2019, “One lab, two firms, many possibilities: on R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry”, Journal of Health Economics, 65, pp. 260-283. (Slides)

- Billette de Villemeur, E., R. Ruble, and B. Versaevel, 2019, “Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 100, pp. 270-296. (Slides)

- Versaevel, B., 2015, “Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics,” Dynamic Games and Applications, 5(4), pp. 440-466. (Special Issue: Dynamic Games in Industrial Organization). (Slides)

- Ruble, R. and B. Versaevel, 2014, “Market Shares, R&D Agreements, and EU Competition Policy,” International Review of Law and Economics, 37, pp. 15-25. (Slides)

- Billette de Villemeur, E., Ruble, R., and B., Versaevel, 2014, “Investment Timing and Vertical Relationships,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 33, pp. 110-123. (Slides)

- Dequiedt, V., and B. Versaevel, 2013, “Patent Pools and Dynamic R&D Incentives,” International Review of Law and Economics, 36, pp. 59-69. (Slides)

- Billette de Villemeur, E., Flochel, L., and B., Versaevel, 2013, “Optimal Collusion with Limited Liability,” International Journal of Economic Theory, 9(3), pp. 203-227. (Slides)

- Billette de Villemeur, E., R. Ruble, and B. Versaevel, 2013, “Caveat Preemptor: Coordination Failure and Success in a Duopoly Investment Game,” Economics Letters, 118(2), pp. 250-254.

- Ruble, R., and Versaevel, B., 2012, “On the Tacit Collusion Equilibria of a Dynamic Duopoly Investment Game,” Economics Bulletin, 32(4), pp. 2817-2827.

- Vencatachellum, D., and B., Versaevel, 2009, “R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers,” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 9: Iss. 1 (Contributions), Article 55.

- Vencatachellum, D., and Versaevel, B., 2008, “Horizontal R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Evidence from France,” Economics Bulletin, 15(19), pp. 1-11.

- Billette de Villemeur, E., and Versaevel, B., 2003, “From Private to Public Common Agency,” Journal of Economic Theory, 111(2), pp. 305-309.

- Versaevel, B., 2002, “Coordination Costs and Vertical Integration in Production Franchise Networks: A Common Agency Model,” Research in Economics, 56(2), pp. 157-186.


- Ruble, R., et B., Versaevel, 2019, « Dynamique des marchés et ajustement de la protection intellectuelle», Revue Lamy de la Concurrence, N°88, pp. 5-11.

- Dargaud, E., Ruble, R., et B., Versaevel, 2019, « Implications des licences FRAND pour la concurrence : un regard économique », Revue Lamy de la Concurrence, N°85, pp. 35-40.

- Dargaud, E., Ruble, R., et B., Versaevel, 2014, « Développements récents de l’approche économique des sanctions dans le cas des cartels ? », Revue Lamy de la Concurrence, N°43, pp. 146-154.

- Ruble, R., et B., Versaevel, 2014, « Quelles spécificités des accords de distribution en ligne ? », Revue Lamy de la Concurrence, N°38, pp. 217-223.

- Ruble, R., et B., Versaevel, 2011, « Quel rôle pour un critère de part de marché dans la réglementation de la coopération en recherche et développement ? », Revue Lamy de la Concurrence, N°31, pp. 199-207.

- Ruble, R., et B., Versaevel, 2010, « Mise en œuvre de la collusion et détection : approches actives et passives », Revue Lamy de la Concurrence, N°22, pp. 11-17.

- Versaevel, B., 2004, « La Description des Marchés Concernés », pp. 92-107 in : Ferrier, D. et Ferré, D., Droit du Contrôle National des Concentrations, collection Référence, Dalloz : Paris.