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Accueil > Vie scientifique > Séminaires et conférences > Séminaires Externes à Ecully

External Seminar

publié le , mis à jour le

2020-2021


Upcoming seminars 2020-2021

Abstract

This paper examines the exchange rate policy in a two-country model with nominal wage rigidities and firm dynamics. We first show that a flexible exchange rate is unable to replicate the flexible price allocation because of the inefficiency generated by incomplete financial markets. In our setting with heterogeneous firms, a monetary intervention aimed at dampening nominal exchange rate fluctuations stabilizes the firm selection in the export market. The reduction in wage setting uncertainty ensured by a fixed exchange rate is particularly relevant when firms are small and homogeneous, thus providing a rationale for the fear of floating in exchange rate policies.

  • November 30, 11.00
    Christian Zehnder (University of Lausanne)
    - "Building an Equilibrium : Rules versus Principles in Relational Contracts"

Abstract

Effective organizations are able to adapt members’ strategies to unforeseen change in an efficient manner. We study when relational contracts enable organizations to achieve this. Specifically, in a novel experiment we explored the hypothesis that basing a relational contract on general principles rather than on specific rules is more successful in achieving efficient adaptation. In our Baseline condition, we indeed observe that, compared to pairs who relied on specific rules, those who articulated general principles achieved significantly higher performance after change occurred. Underlying this correlation, we also find that pairs with principle-based agreements were more likely both to expect and to take actions that were consistent with what their relational contract prescribed. To investigate whether there is a causal link between principle-based agreements and performance, we implemented a "Nudge" intervention intended to foster principle-based relational contracts. The Nudge succeeded in causing more pairs to articulate principles, but the intervention failed to increase performance after the shock because many of the pairs induced to articulate principles then did not take actions that were consistent with their relational contracts. In short, our results suggest that (1) principle-based relational contracts may improve organizational performance, but also that (2) high-performing relational contracts may be difficult to build.

  • February 22, 11.00
    Christoph Trebesch (Kiel Institute for the World Economy and Kiel University)
    - TBA

Past seminars 2020-2021

  • September 21, 11.00
    Andrea Tesei (Queen Mary University of London)
    - "Information, Technology Adoption and Productivity : The Role of Mobile Phones in Agriculture" (with A. Gupta and J. Ponticelli).

Abstract

We study the effect of information on technology adoption and productivity in agriculture. Our empirical strategy exploits the expansion of the mobile phone network in previously uncovered areas of rural India coupled with the availability of call centers for agricultural advice. We measure information on agricultural practices by analyzing the content of 2.5 million phone calls made by farmers to one of India’s leading call centers for agricultural advice. We find that areas receiving coverage from new towers and with no language barriers between farmers and advisers answering their calls experience higher adoption of high yielding varieties of seeds and other complementary inputs, as well as higher increase in agricultural productivity. Our estimates indicate that information frictions can explain around 25 percent of the agricultural productivity gap between the most productive and the least productive areas in our sample.

  • September 28, 11.00
    Björn Bartling (University of Zurich)
    - "Free to Fail ? Paternalistic Preferences in the U.S." (with A. Cappelen, H. Hermes, M. Skivenes and B. Tungodden).

Abstract

We study paternalistic preferences in a large-scale experiment, where 14,000 people sampled from the general population of the U.S., have the option to intervene and prevent additionally sampled, real workers from making consequential mistakes. Our data show that the nature of an intervention affects peoples’ willingness to intervene substantially : people are much more willing to provide information than to restrict freedom of choice, even if the outcome is identical. We propose a simple formal framework that allows us to categorize people as either non-interventionists, liberal paternalists, or hard paternalists, and we study the relation of type classification and background characteristics.


Past External Seminars (all years)


Agenda

séminaire

  • Lundi 23 novembre 11:00-12:15 - Francesco Pappadà - Paris School of Economics

    External Seminar Francesco Pappadà

  • Lundi 30 novembre 11:00-12:00 - Christian Zehnder - University of Lausanne

    External Seminar Christian Zehnder

    Lieu : Online


  • Lundi 7 décembre 11:00-12:15 - Michel Maréchal - Univ. Zürich

    External Seminar Michel Maréchal

  • Lundi 22 février 2021 11:00-12:15 - Christoph Trebesch - Kiel Institute for the World Economy

    External Seminar Christoph Trebesch

  • Lundi 24 mai 2021 11:00-12:15 - Alexander Cappelen - NHH

    External Seminar Alexander Cappelen

  • Lundi 31 mai 2021 11:00-12:15 - Emanuele Campiglio - University of Bologna

    External Seminar Emanuele Campiglio

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