

BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS WORKSHOP



# BEE WORKSHOP

LYON | TOULOUSE 2015

DECEMBER, 7-8, 2015 | ECULLY, FRANCE

Organization: GATE (Lyon) and TSE/IAST (Toulouse)





## 4<sup>th</sup> BEE Workshop Venue: GATE, Écully

Day 1: Monday December 7<sup>th</sup>

**12:00-12:55: Registration and lunch**

**12:55-13:00: Welcome Address by Marie Claire Villeval**

**SESSION 1.** Chair: Marie Claire Villeval (GATE)

13:00-13:30: **Boris van Leeuwen** (IAST/TSE)

*Competition for Status Creates Superstars: An Experiment on Public Good Provision and Network Formation*

13:30-14:00: **Liza Charroin** (CeDEx/ GATE)

*Sequentiality and Heterogeneity in Network Formation Games*

14:00-14:30: **Jeanne Bovet** (IAST/TSE)

*Mapping Females' Bodily Features of Attractiveness*

**14:30 - 15:00: Coffee Break**

**SESSION 2.** Chair: Paul Seabright (IAST/TSE)

15:00-15:20: **Charlotte Saucet** (GATE)

*Motivated Beliefs : an Insight on Selective Memory and Wishful Thinking*

15:20-15:40: **Charlotte Cavaille** (IAST/TSE)

*Deservingness, Self-Interest and the Social Policy Preferences*

15:40-16:00: **Rémi Suchon** (GATE)

*Upward Social Mobility, Distributive and Trust Behavior: an Experimental Approach*

## **16:00 - 16:30: Coffee Break**

**SESSION 3.** Chair: Stéphane Robin (GATE)

16:30-17:00: **Fabio Galeotti** (GATE)

*Cheating in the Lab Predicts Cheating in the Field! An Experiment in Public Transportations*

17.00-17.30: **Eva Raiber** (IAST/TSE)

*God Insures the Ones Who Pay? Formal Insurance and Religious Offerings in a Pentecostal Church*

17:30-18.00: **Julien Benistant** (GATE)

*Social identity, Competition and Antisocial Behaviors*

**18:00: Departure to Lyon**

**19:00: Dinner at *Le Grand Café des Négociants* - Lyon**

## Day 2: Tuesday December 8<sup>th</sup>

### 9:00 - 9:30: Welcome Coffee

#### SESSION 1. Chair: Astrid Hopfensitz (IAST/TSE)

9:30-10:00: **Zhixin Dai** (GATE)

*On the Optimal Design of Crackdowns: Theory and Experimental Evidence*

10:00-10:30: **Dominik Duell** (IAST/TSE)

*Discrimination in Strategic Interactions*

10:30-11:00: **Anca Mihut** (GATE)

*Linear or non Linear Pricing: Evidence from the Lab about the Individual Preference for Tariffs*

11:00-11:30: **Jonathan Stiglitz** (IAST/TSE)

*Why Inefficiency? Resource Distribution Preferences of Married Adults in a High Fertility, Transitioning Subsistence Population*

### 11:30 - 12:00: Coffee Break

#### SESSION 2. Chair: Camille Cornand (GATE)

12:00-12:20 **Valeria Maggian** (Bicocca/GATE)

*Getting to the Top: How the Timing of Gender Quotas Affects Women Career Choice*

12:20-12:40: **Vincent Théroude** (GATE)

*How do People Contribute to a Risky Voluntary Contribution Mechanism? An Experimental Approach*

12:40-13:00: **Heidi Colleran** (IAST/TSE)

*Variation in Medical Moral Dilemmas: Preliminary Evidence from a non-Western Population*

13:00-13:20: **Thibaud Mazerm** (GATE)

*Talking Stick versus Carrot : an Experiment Study on Feedbacks in Piece-rate*

### 13:20 - 14:30: Lunch


# Workshop Venue

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St. Etienne (GATE)

Seminar Room

93 Chemin des Mouilles, 69130 Écully, France

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
# Workshop Dinner

Le Grand Café des Négociants

1 Place Francisque Régaud, 69002 Lyon, France

+33 4 78 42 50 05

[www.lesnegociants.com](http://www.lesnegociants.com)





# Abstracts

## Day 1: Monday December 7<sup>th</sup>

### Session 1

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#### **Competition for Status Creates Superstars: An Experiment on Public Good Provision and Network Formation (Boris van Leeuwen, Toulouse)**

We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematically examine the effects of group size and status rents. The experimental results provide very clear support for a competition for status dynamic that predicts when, and if so which, repeated game equilibrium is reached. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that the supergame effects we observe are driven by social preferences.

#### **Sequentiality and heterogeneity in network formation games (Liza Charroin, Lyon)**

This paper studies network formation in the laboratory based on the two-way flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000). In their model, one agent pays the linking cost but both agents involved in the connection benefit from it. We extend their model with two properties: heterogeneity and sequentiality. The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we study the effect of sequentiality in the network formation process. Using backward induction, we show that the equilibrium network is asymmetric and leads to unequal payoffs. Second, with the introduction of heterogeneity, we aim at analyzing what drives popularity. Within groups, one agent is called “special agent” and is singled out from the others. Creating a link with this agent generates a higher benefit. Our experiment consists of three treatments. In the endogenous treatment (ENDO), the selection of the special agent is based on his relative performance in a preliminary real effort task. In the exogenous treatment (EXO), the special agent is randomly selected, so that he does not “earn” his status. In the non-monetary treatment (NM), the special agent has no additional monetary value. The determination of this special player is based on the group member’s evaluation of individual attributes. Our first result indicates that agents tend to equalize payoffs by creating the same number of links. Second, the results show that agents tend to form more links with the special agent than with the non singled out agents in ENDO and EXO. The special agent is particularly popular in these treatments because it is safer to be connected to him to be sure to enjoy his high value and because non singled out agents expect that the other group’s members will also connect to him. The special agent in NM does not get more popularity. Our experiment shows that the monetary value of the special agent is the main driver of popularity. Popularity is not driven by merit or personal tastes.

#### **Mapping females’ bodily features of attractiveness (Jeanne Bovet, Toulouse)**

“Beauty is bought by judgment of the eye” (Shakespeare, *Love’s Labour’s Lost*), but the bodily features governing this critical biological choice are still debated. Eye movement studies have demonstrated that males sample coarse body regions expanding from the face, the breasts and the midriff, while making female attractiveness judgements with natural vision. However, the visual system ubiquitously extracts diagnostic extra-foveal information in natural conditions, thus the visual information actually used by men is still unknown. We thus used a parametric gaze-contingent design while males rated

attractiveness of female front- and back-view bodies. Males used extra-foveal information when available. Critically, when bodily features were only visible through restricted apertures, fixations strongly shifted to the hips, to potentially extract hip-width and curvature, then the breast and face. Our hierarchical mapping suggests that the visual system primary uses hip information to compute the waist-to-hip ratio and the body mass index, the crucial factors in determining sexual attractiveness and mate selection.

## Session 2

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### **Motivated beliefs: an insight on selective memory and wishful thinking (Charlotte Saucet, Lyon)**

Recent theories in behavioral economics have put the emphasis on motivated beliefs. Individuals tend to form and revise beliefs in a distorted way to serve their interests and increase their motivation or satisfaction. This leads to consider beliefs as an “asset that people invest in” (Benabou, 2014). There are several possible modes of belief distortion that are based either on ex-ante or ex-post distortion of information. Wishful thinking can illustrate the first type of bias while selective memory can lead to the second type. So far, they have usually been studied separately. Studying simultaneously selective memory about one’s abilities in a past performance and wishful thinking about uncertain future events should allow to better understand the process of motivated beliefs within individuals. We designed an experiment that allows us to measure the existence and the strenght of selective memory and wishful thinking within individuals. It also allows us to test how the efficiency of decision-making is affected by motivated beliefs and so whether motivated beliefs are good or not for the individual and for the society through their impact on efficiency.

### **Deservingness, Self-Interest and the Social Policy Preferences (Charlotte Cavaille, Toulouse)**

A common assumption in political economy is that voters are self-regarding maximizers of material goods, choosing their preferred level of social spending accordingly. In contrast, students of American social policy have emphasized the key role of an other-regarding motive that makes support for social transfers conditional on the perceived deservingness of recipients. The two motives often conflict as large portions of the poor (rich) find recipients undeserving (deserving). Under what conditions might one motive trump the other? I argue that material self-interest overruns perceptions of deservingness when the material stakes are high. To put it different, deservingness considerations will matter more if a given individual does not expect to rely one day on social transfers. I test my argument through a survey experiment where I change individuals’ priors about their risk of being unemployed and consequently receiving unemployment benefits. I expect the treatment to result in treated individuals being less pessimistic about their unemployment prospects (multiple studies have documented high levels of pessimism in assessing true unemployment risk exposure). Among the treated, beliefs about the deservingness of the unemployed (e.g. are they trying hard enough to find a job) should be more predictive of support for publicly funded unemployment insurance. In line with the assumption that deservingness beliefs are orthogonal to self-interest, I do not expect any difference between the treated and the control in terms of average deservingness beliefs.



## **Upward social mobility, distributive and trust behavior: an experimental approach (Rémi Suchon, Lyon)**

People are endowed with a set of memberships in social groups, the sum of which determine one's social identity. Among those memberships, some are imposed to the individuals, such as race, gender, or family social background. Those can be considered as "inherited" memberships. One doesn't decide upon endorsing it or not. On the other hand, other memberships into groups widely depend on one's behavior, talents, motivation... Those are "achieved" memberships (Kulich et al. 2015). In a fully fluid society, one's inherited membership wouldn't prevent individuals to reach any position in the society or, put differently, to reach any achieved group. It is obvious that this ideal situation is not even close from reality. Indeed, the place where one was born, the social background of the family he grew up in, the neighborhood where he met his childhood friends widely predict one's future position in the society i.e. one's achieved group membership. But in some cases, individuals end up breaking with this social determinism, and manage to reach high achieved status despite inherited background predictions. We call this upward social mobility. There are some evidences that individuals who experience mobility behave differently toward their inherited and achieved peers. For instance, the so-called "Queen Bee effect" has been observed in male-dominated organization (e.g. Derks et al. 2015 in the case of Hindustanis workers): when a woman reaches a high position, she seems to reduce her concern toward those left behind. There are also evidences that mobile individual are treated differently by both the achieved group members and the inherited group members. For instance, "acting white type of stigmas" are retaliations from and against black young people who are considered to act like white people because they do well in what are considered "white marked area" such as education (e.g. Fryer & Torelli 2012). We aim at identifying a causal impact of upward social mobility for distributive and trust behaviors. To do so, we design a lab experiment. This lab experiment relies on natural identities: subjects are recruited from two local universities. Being from either university is, within the framework of the experiment, an inherited identity. On the top of this, we induce achieved groups of status. We design a control where no mobility is possible, and additional treatments to disentangle the relative effect of the increase of social distance in the process of mobility, and effect of the change in relative status. Thanks to a between design, we expect to observe a change of transfer in trust and dictator games from and toward mobile individuals.

## **Session 3**

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### **Cheating in the Lab Predicts Cheating in the Field! An Experiment in Public Transportations (Fabio Galeotti, Lyon)**

We conduct an artefactual field experiment using passengers of the public transport service in France to study whether dishonesty in real life is related to dishonesty in the laboratory. Dishonesty in the field is measured with self-reports and by asking participants to exchange a validated ticket with a new one at the end of the experiment. We also recruit a sub-sample of subjects immediately after they paid a fine. Dishonesty in the lab is measured using both an abstract task (i.e. reporting the outcome of a privately rolled die) and a contextualized task (an original public transportation game). In the second but not in the first task, dishonesty can be individually verified by the experimenter. We find that (a) behavior in the abstract task is in general related to dishonesty in real life; (b) fare-dodgers who had just paid their fine behave more honestly than the other fare-dodgers; (c) subjects who care about their social image are more honest when their behavior can be verified by the experimenter. Overall, our experiment shows that simple tests of dishonesty in the lab may capture some individual attributes that predict dishonesty in real life. Cautions must be however taken when the behavior can be individually monitored and verified by the experimenter.

## **God Insures the Ones Who Pay? Formal Insurance and Religious Offerings in a Pentecostal Church (Eva Raiber, Toulouse)**

This project aims at investigating the potential substitution effects between formal insurance and insurance provided by a religious institution. Contributions of members of religious organisations may give them a right to access financial resources of the organisation in times of need or decrease the members' subject probability of damage happening because they believe in a divine involvement in their favor. We run an experiment with active members of a Pentecostal Church in Accra, Ghana, a country of extreme religiosity in terms of religious adherence and beliefs. We randomly enrolled one third of the participants in a funeral policy insurance and one third received information about this insurance. Participants are then asked to allocate a certain amount of money between two options where the options include donating money to their church, donating money to an NGO, donating money to an inter-denominational organisation, and keeping the money. We thus test the hypothesis if enrollment in a formal insurance scheme decreases the amount donated to the church. Furthermore, we investigate if in this case, giving to church is different than giving to an NGO or inter-denominational organisation.

## **Social identity, competition and antisocial behaviors (Julien Benistant, Lyon)**

Competitive incentives lead individuals to work harder but they can also sometimes motivate people to exert sabotage or to cheat at the expense of the company or of their colleagues. It remains however unclear how, in this context, social identity affects behavior and efficiency. On the one hand, fraternization among co-workers sharing the same identity and team-spirit can reduce the risk of sabotage but encourage rivalry. On the other hand group identity may reinforce competitiveness and anti-social behavior when individuals are matched with out-groups. It is unclear whether the two effects offset each other or not. In this paper we test the effect of social identity on two antisocial behaviors, cheating and sabotage in a 2-player Tullock lottery contest with a real-effort task. We compare two treatments, in which we form or not social identity. In the presence of group identity, we test whether people adjust their sabotage and cheating behavior to the identity of their competitor. Results suggest that identity does have an effect on these antisocial behavior but only for a category of subjects.

## **Day 2: Monday December 8<sup>th</sup>**

### **Session 1**

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## **On the Optimal Design of Crackdowns: Theory and Experimental Evidence (Zhixin Dai, Lyon)**

We first develop a game-theoretic model to capture the ubiquitous phenomenon of endogenous crackdowns in the domain of tax evasion, i.e., sudden and dramatic increases of audit probability triggered by a low level of compliance. In the model, subjects in matched groups face two different audit probabilities. This audit probability depends on the outcome of previous audits. Mean compliance below a certain threshold triggers an increase in the probability of audit that remains high until mean compliance reaches a preset threshold. This model is tested by means of a laboratory experiment in which we compare various information settings. Experimental results in the no information treatment show that the majority of the subjects (83.14%) reports fully their income during crackdown periods and the average duration of crackdowns is less than 2 periods, which reveal the effectiveness of such

endogenous crackdowns. More importantly, subjects report a fraction of their income that is much higher than the equilibrium even during non-crackdown periods. This is consistent with the observation that in the real world compliance is generally considered to be relatively high, despite low inspection probabilities and small fines being imposed. We further test whether crackdowns should be disclosed or not although information is irrelevant theoretically. Our additional two treatments indicate that announcements can increase significantly the compliance rate both when crackdowns were pre-announced and when they were announced ex post. We lastly show that endogenous crackdowns do not decrease efficiency compared to a random/exogenous setting. Overall, our results contribute to the reflection on how to design more effective audit policies.

### **Discrimination in strategic interactions (Dominik Duell, Toulouse)**

In a laboratory investigation of a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard, we isolate the effect of the strategic environment on subjects' beliefs and choices and provide a direct test of the strategic theory of statistical discrimination. We find that when principals use the sanctioning tools at their disposal in an outcome-contingent way, they attribute good outcomes more readily to their agents' effort and reward their agents more frequently when they share a social identity, but when principals do not use the sanctioning tools outcome-contingently or have no access to sanctioning tools, they do not hold such beliefs. In a strategic setting, agents tend to anticipate needing to meet a lower outcome threshold to receive a reward from the in-group principals and condition their effort choice on that expectation, increasing the effort with the increase in the expected demanded outcome and with the greater expectation of identity-based reward bias in their favor. A key factor determining the agents' responsiveness to their expectation of the principals' reward bias is the agents' attitude toward risk, suggesting limitations on the power of a norm of reciprocal favoritism as an explanation. While principals' effort attribution judgments with respect to in-group agents tend to be close to correct, they under-value the effort of the out-group agents. The evidence suggests that prejudice and discrimination may owe more to the strategic nature of the environment than previously recognized. We propose institutions that block incentives for strategically-driven discrimination.

### **Linear or non linear pricing: evidence from the lab about the individual preference for tariffs (Anca Mihut, Lyon)**

Consumers are often faced with tariff choices (mobile phone, electricity, train, airplane, gas...). It may be very complex to choose among these tariff. Typically, what should consumers choose between a simple flat tariff pricing and a more complex but also more advantageous non linear tariff structure? In this study we focus on the identification and the analysis of the biases that consumers face when deciding between different types of tariff structures with several layers of obfuscating complexity and uncertain future usage levels or profiles. We also try to look more carefully into these issues through the lenses of behavioral economics, putting into discussion the impact of such cognitive biases as decision framing, risk attitude and focalization effects. We conduct laboratory experiments and our results confirm such biases. We show that, in the lab, even when the more complex non linear tariff structures are 50% more advantageous, consumers constantly stick to the tariff with the most simple

structure. Subjects repeatedly avoid pricing instruments containing a fixed cost and increasing block pricing structures.

### **Why inefficiency? Resource distribution preferences of married adults in a high fertility, transitioning subsistence population (Jonathan Stiglitz, Toulouse)**

This paper tests models of household decision-making using an experimental design among Bolivian forager-farmers. A “distribution task” consisting of 15 questions was completed by husbands and wives from the same marriages (n=53 marriages). For each question a participant selected one of two options specifying his/her preferred allocation of a resource between him/herself and a partner (option A: an equal division of amount X between partners; option B: not always equally divided between partners but always efficient in terms of maximizing household production). Participants were queried about their resource allocation preferences in two currencies, meat and money, which have been central to human exchange throughout history, and which vary in their fungibility, storability and defensibility. Two hypotheses tested are that: 1) among Tsimane, money (vs. meat) promotes greater spousal preferences for inefficient divisions; and 2) Tsimane (vs. French) are more likely to prefer an efficient division of money. These hypotheses are largely supported: among Tsimane preference for an inefficient division is more prevalent for money (13% of husbands, 30% of wives) than meat (0% of husbands, 4% of wives). Mixed effects logistic regression indicates a strong negative effect of currency type on the probability of selecting an efficient division (adjusted ORMoney (vs. Meat)=0.043,  $p < 0.001$ , n=1,590 observations of 106 individuals). This effect is not moderated by age, sex, number of offspring, marital duration, level of schooling (or difference in schooling between spouses) or perceived task difficulty. Reported preferences are also nearly identical whether incentives are real (dried meat) or hypothetical (fresh meat), suggesting that the nature of participant compensation does not strongly affect results. We also find that preference for an efficient division of money is more prevalent among Tsimane (78%) vs. French (58%) spouses. Preferences for household efficiency are ubiquitous for meat but not money among married Tsimane adults. Spousal preferences for inefficiency may be linked to spousal conflicts over optimal resource allocations, which may increase with increasing market participation.

## **Session 2**

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### **Getting to the Top: how the timing of gender quotas affects women career choice (Valeria Maggian, Lyon)**

Our aim is to study the long run effect of gender quota on women decision to apply for jobs. By mean of an experiment, we investigate males and females decision to compete in a multi-stage environment, resembling a career ladder. Our goal is to evaluate the optimal timing for introducing a gender quota (at an early or late stage of career) and its impact on candidates' choice to compete, performance and beliefs about others' competitive attitude. Our results are relevant for designing policies aimed at increasing the labor force participation of women. We will stimulate the debate about long-term effects of affirmative actions, a new and almost unexplored topic.

## **How do People Contribute to a Risky Voluntary Contribution Mechanism? An Experimental Approach (Vincent Thérroude, Lyon)**

A significant body of literature has focused on linear public good games, highlighting the role of beliefs and social preferences in the contribution decision. Nonetheless, this literature does not take into account common situations of risky returns. Indeed, when people choose to contribute to a public good, there is often a form of uncertainty about the potential returns. This risky environment can modify the classical results and calls into question the classical methodology. Experiments yield divergent results on subjects' behavior in a situation with imperfect information. We replicate and extend the experiment by Levati, Morone and Fiore (2009) with an additional treatment in order to disentangle loss aversion from risk aversion. We refine the classical methodology by incorporating measures of social preferences with the Social Value Orientation test (Murphy et al., 2011), eliciting beliefs, and controlling for individual characteristics such as risk aversion (Eckel and Grossman, 2008), and loss aversion (Gächter et al., 2012).

## **Variation in medical moral dilemmas: preliminary evidence from a non-Western population Heidi Colleran, Toulouse)**

Who should be saved when resources are scarce? This simple question is of broad importance both for researchers wishing to understand how people value the lives of others, and in applied contexts, for policy makers and medical practitioners. Medical ethical research assumes that people's allocation preferences maximise welfare. Experiments have shown that such preferences don't always maximise life expectancy and appear to favour reproductive-aged women over other adults. An evolutionary perspective provides a wider range of hypotheses to test, for example that people might value investments in others' reproductive success based on kinship ties, or other psychological biases. These causal mechanisms could be cross culturally universal or highly context-specific. There is very little information on ethical preferences outside WEIRD populations. This is hampered by a lack of psychological and cultural realism in experimental designs, and assumptions about high levels of numeracy that make cross-cultural work difficult. To address these issues, we are developing a cross-cultural study of moral dilemmas targeting non-WEIRD populations, using realistic scenarios and simple, intuitive stimuli. Here we present preliminary results from a pilot study in the Peruvian Altiplano. Using photographic stimuli of men and women in three age groups, and a repeated forced-choice structure, we examined whether a decision to give life-saving medicine elicits age- and sex-based preferential treatment. We find a strong preference for younger over older recipients, but also preferences against reproductive-aged women. We discuss our findings in light of existing research and the ecological and demographic features of the study-context that differ from the typical Western study population.

## **Talking Stick versus Carrot: An experiment study on feedbacks in piece-rate (Thibaud Mazerm, Lyon)**

This paper investigates the potential use of combining verbal communication and punishment (leading to credible threats) and its impact on the effectiveness of piece-rate as a contract enforcement device. Recent studies in public good games show that it is a more successful and less costly mechanism than monetary punishment in order to raise cooperation. Taking into account reciprocity, bonus contracts seem to outperformed contract with penalty structure, we are interested in finding if there is a possible trade-off for the principal between offering an important bonus and using credible threats.

## List of participants

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