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Quand :
25 novembre 2022 @ 13 h 00 – 14 h 00
2022-11-25T13:00:00+01:00
2022-11-25T14:00:00+01:00
Où :
Ecully salle des séminaires
Pharmaceutical price negotiations in a differentiated duopoly
To limit public expenditures, many countries chose to use negotiations with pharmaceutical firms to limit drug prices. We study the effect of competition, and more specifically the existence of a pharmaceutical substitute, on these price negotiations between health authority and pharmaceutical firms. We particularly study the relationship between price and co-payment and the effects this may have on public policies frequently use as cost containment. We use Nash bargaining theory to determine the optimal negotiated price in such situations. Furthermore, we show that optimal co-payments are the lowest possible, when patients pay nothing, as it is the case in the monopoly framework (Jelovac 2015).
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